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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
INCOME TAXES: COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL APPLIED
TO THE CIVIL FRAUD PENALTY
A husband was convicted of willfully attempting to evade his in-
come taxes in violation of Section 145(b) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1939.' Subsequently, upon the filing of a joint return, the Internal
Revenue Service assessed the fifty percent fraud penalty jointly against
the taxpayer-husband and his wife pursuant to Section 293(b) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939.2 The penalties were paid, and the tax-
payers brought suit for a refund. The sole evidence introduced by the
government at the trial was a certified copy of the criminal indictment,
judgment and commitment against the taxpayer-husband. The trial court
permitted the husband's prior criminal conviction for willfully attempting
to evade his income taxes to operate as a collateral estoppel, foreclosing
him and his wife from relitigating the issue of fraud for those taxable
years. On appeal, held, affirmed. The term "willfully" as used in Section
145(b) necessarily includes the elements of "fraud" as used in Section
293(b). Accordingly, the doctrine of collateral estoppel forecloses re-
litigation of the factual issue of fraud. Tomlinson v. Lefkowitz, 334 F.2d
262 (5th Cir. 1964).
Collateral estoppel is an adjunct to the ancient judicial doctrine of
res judicata.3 The principle of res judicata applies only when the same
cause of action arises between the same parties.4 Collateral estoppel, on
the other hand, operates in different causes of action as to all matters
which were in issue or were controverted in the prior litigation and
1. The text provides:
Any person . . . who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any
tax imposed by this chapter or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other
penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof,
shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or
both, together with the costs of prosecution. (Emphasis supplied.)
INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 7201 is substantially the same.
2. The text is as follows:
If any part of any deficiency is due to fraud with intent to evade tax, then 50
per centum of the total amount of the deficiency (in addition to such deficiency)
shall be so assessed, collected, and paid, in lieu of the 50 per centum addition
to the tax provided in section 3612(d) (2).
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 6653(b) although not identical, is substantially the same.
3. Cromwell v. County of SAC, 94 U.S. 351 (1876). It is vital to recognize the distinc-
tion beween the effect of a judgment upon the cause of action on which the judgment is
based (res judicata) and its effect upon a subsequent controversy between the parties based
upon a different cause of action (collateral estoppel). Generally, a judgment puts an end to
the cause of action which is the basis of the proceeding in which the judgment is rendered.
See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 68 (1942). However, a judgment can effect a subsequent
controversy based upon a different cause of action involving the same or some of the same
questions which were involved in the original action. The original judgment is conclusive
between the parties only as to matters actually litigated and determined in the prior action.
It is not conclusive as to matters which might have been, but were not, actually litigated
and determined. See Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1942).
4. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 68 (1942).
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upon which the determination of the judgment was rendered.' The appli-
cation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel to tax litigation has long
been recognized by the Supreme Court: "Where a question of fact
essential to the judgment is actually litigated and determined in the first
tax proceeding, the parties are bound by that determination .. .even
though the cause of action is different."6 However, collateral estoppel is
never applied to every fact determined in the first action which later
becomes an issue in the second suit.' For the estoppel to apply con-
clusively in a subsequent controversy, the fact must have been essential
to the rendition of the first judgment and be an ultimate fact necessary
in the determination of the second suit.8 In effect, applying collateral
estoppel in tax controversies prevents relitigation of the identical question
of whether a statute applies to a taxpayers' status.' However, it has been
heretofore clearly recognized that collateral estoppel is confined to situa-
tions where the matter raised in the second suit is identical in all respects
with that decided in the first proceeding and when the controlling facts
and applicable legal rules remain unchanged.'° As a result, where the
legal matter determined in the earlier decision differs with that raised
in the second controversy, collateral estoppel has no effect." Similarly,
when the situation subsequently is vitally altered after the rendition of
the first judgment, the prior determination is no longer conclusive. 2
Even a judicial declaration which intervenes between the two proceedings
may so change the legal atmosphere as to render the rule of collateral
estoppel inapplicable." Of course, when a question of fact essential to the
prior judgment is actually litigated and determined in the first proceeding,
the parties are bound by that determination in the subsequent proceeding,
notwithstanding that the cause of action is different. 4 It has been estab-
5. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Southern
Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1 (1897); Cromwell v. County of SAC, 94 U.S.
351 (1876); Russell v. Place, 94 U.S. 606 (1876). While the doctrine of collateral estoppel
may be applicable to questions of fact, it may not be conclusive as to questions of law.
United States v. Stone & Downer Co., 274 U.S. 225 (1927). On the other hand, there are
cases in which it has been held that a judgment is conclusive in a subsequent controversy
between the same parties as to matters of law which were litigated and determined in the
previous action. United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236 (1924).
6. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 601 (1948).
7. Rex v. Duchess of Kingston, 20 How St. Tr. 355 (House of Lords, 1776).
8. The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1944). For this purpose ultimate
facts are those facts upon whose combined occurrence the law raises a duty or right as
distinguished from evidentiary facts or mediate datum which are those facts from which
existence may be rationally inferred the existence of an ultimate fact. Ibid.
9. Tait v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 620 (1933).
10. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948); Tait v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 289
U.S. 620 (1933).
11. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 161 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1947).
12. State Farm Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154 (1945).
13. Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
14. The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1944).
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lished that a prior judgment can also be conclusive as to the legal issues
appearing in a controversy relating to different taxable years.1
5
Whether or not the statutory concept of "willfulness" was intended
to encompass the "elements of fraud" has long been subject to contro-
versy. 16 The leading Supreme Court decision on the issue, Helvering v.
Mitchell,17 was easily distinguished by the Lejkowitz tribunal." In
Helvering, the government urged that the application of the doctrine
was precluded by the difference in issues presented in the two cases. The
government had expressly contended that the issue of whether Mitchell
had "willfully" attempted to evade or defeat the tax was not identical
to whether he had done so "fraudulently."' 9 In Lefkowitz, the court
recognized that the Helvering case could not assert an estoppel on the
question of fraud in a subsequent civil action founded on an acquittal in a
prior criminal case because of the different standards of proof involved.
Interestingly, in Helvering it was the commissioner who was seeking to
avoid imposition of the collateral estoppel doctrine in order to impose
a fraud penalty on a taxpayer who was previously acquitted of willfully
attempting to evade income taxes. It seems that the government position
on the issue is being tailored to suit its own convenience.
In a later tax court decision, the government sought collaterally to
estop a taxpayer convicted of attempting to defeat and evade a portion
of his income taxes from litigating the fraud penalties under Section
293(b) of the Revenue Code of 1939.20 The tax court relied heavily
on Helvering by pointing out that the penalties for criminal and civil
fraud are essentially different in character and were enacted for wholly
different purposes.2 ' The tax court, at least, has been consistent. In
Vassallo,2' an almost identical factual situation to the Lefkowitz case
was presented to the tax court. The court clearly established that a
taxpayer's conviction under Section 145 was not res judicata in a court
proceeding under Section 293(b). It would certainly appear that at the
time Lefkowitz was decided in the federal district court, the tax court
was firmly committed to the proposition that collateral estoppel would
not apply.28 Nevertheless, the federal court, in Lefkowitz, disregarded the
15. Stoddard v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1944); Campana Corp. v. Harrison,
135 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1943); Engineers' Club of Philadelphia v. United States, 95 Ct. Cl.
42, 42 F. Supp. 182 (1942).
16. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); United States v. Scharton, 285 U.S.
518 (1932); Amos, 43 T.C. 50 (1964); Safra, 30 T.C. 1026 (1958).
17. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
18. Tomlinson v. Lefkowitz, 334 F.2d 262, 265 (5th Cir. 1964).
19. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 398 (1938).
20. Safra, 30 T.C. 1026 (1958).
21. Id. at 1035.
22. 23 T.C. 656 (1955).
23. See, Safra v. Comm. 30 T.C. 1026, 1035 (1958), where the court specifically stated:
We are aware of no decision which holds that a conviction for criminal fraud in a
United States District Court estops a taxpayer from denying a determination of
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tax court's view by concluding that the term "willfully" necessarily
includes the elements of "fraud" as used in the respective statutes. In the
court's view, the term "willfully," as used in the criminal statute, is a
"specific intent involving the bad purpose and evil motives to evade and
defeat the payment . . . of income tax."24 Correspondingly, the fraud
necessary for imposition of the fifty percent fraud penalty is a "specific
purpose to avoid a tax known to be owing."2 Clearly, the court reasoned,
comparison of the components of the two terms discloses that the element
of fraud is encompassed in the concept of willfullness. The difference, if
any, is merely in the degree of motive or evil purpose, not in the elements
themselves.26
Since the Lefkowitz decision in the federal district court, the tax
court has expressly receded from its prior position in Safra by adopting
the doctrine of collateral estoppel.27 However, the recanting of the tax
court was bitterly opposed.28 Justice Whitney assailed the view of the
bare majority as being a principle which effectively deprives a taxpayer
who has been convicted under Section 7201,29 of his constitutional right to
due process of law before being deprived of his property through the use
of collateral estoppel.80
A more intriguing problem presented by Lefkowitz is whether the
wife could be collaterally estopped by the criminal conviction of her
husband. It is uncontrovertable that a wife who is a party to a fraudulent
joint return may be held liable for the fraud penalties assessed on account
of her husband's fraud in preparing that return even though she had no
income, did not entertain any fraudulent intent, and did not know that
the return was fraudulent.8 ' However, in Lejkowitz, no tax returns were
filed prior to the husband's conviction. The delinquent joint tax returns
were filed after the conviction and the liability reported was accurate
and uncontested. Therefore, the issue presented is whether a husband's
additions to tax for fraud in a tax court proceeding and a respondent has cited
none. Therefore, we are inclined to follow our previous decisions in holding that
the petitioner is not collaterally estopped to deny that a portion of the deficiencies
herein was due to fraud with intent to evade a tax.
24. Bloch v. United States, 221 F.2d 786, 789 (9th Cir. 1955).
25. Powell v. Granquist, 252 F.2d 56, 60 (9th Cir. 1958).
26. Tomlinson v. Lefkowitz, 334 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1964).
27. Amos, 43 T.C. 50 (1964).
28. Id. at 58, et seq.
29. hr. REV. CODE of 1954, corresponding to § 145(b) of the INT. REV. CODE of 1939.
30. Amos, 43 T.C. 50, 58 (1964). A federal district court in Virginia appears to have
lent support to this position by refusing to follow the Lejkowitz decision, although the
facts presented are distinguishable on other grounds. The issue involved was the extent to
which a stipulation between the government and a taxpayer in a prior criminal fraud
proceeding could collaterally estop a party from denying the accuracy of the tax liability
in a subsequent civil fraud proceeding. Since the amount of taxable income is not essential
to the determination of the criminal conviction, the court held that the doctrine of col-
lateral estoppel should not apply in any event. Moore v. United States, 235 F. Supp. 387
(W.D. Va. 1964).
31. Cirillo v. Commissioner, 314 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1963).
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fraud committed prior to the filing of the joint delinquent income tax
return, which is accurate, can be imputed to the wife. Admittedly, Section
6013(d) (3)32 provides that liability shall be joint and several where a
joint return is filed. However, in Lefkowitz, the fraud penalty was not
imposed or measured by a deficiency founded on filing the joint return.
The deficiency upon which the government imposed its fraud penalty was
based on the husband's failure to file his return with an intent to evade
taxes. Presumably, a wife electing to sign a joint return is liable only for
the tax reported on the return including any deficiency which may be
assessed in connection with the filing. It is difficult to visualize any.basis
upon which the wife could be subject to liability.83 Unfortunately, the
Lefkowitz court failed to meet the issue. The court sidestepped the prob-
lem by indicating that the plea on behalf of the wife was unsupported by
any evidence that it was the wife that had made the payment of the
fraud penalties with her own funds as distinguished from those of her
husband. Therefore, in effect, the court contended, that she failed to
demonstrate standing to recover the payments when she did not allege or
prove that she had made them. By this rationale, the wife would be
subject to liability for the assessment but have no remedy for refund
unless she herself had made the payment.
The Lefkowitz decision represents an extended application of the
doctrine of collateral estoppel that goes far beyond the intent announced
by the court over fifty years ago. 84 Nevertheless, it is a step in the right
direction. The Lefkowitz decision, in its approach, is harmonious with
the intent of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Unnecessary relitigation
of factual issues should be avoided. Making minute and pointless distinc-
tions in statutory verbiage is undesirable. It is untenable to deny that a
conviction for willfullness to evade a tax, proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, does not necessarily encompass the elements of fraud in a subse-
quent contest where the standard of proof is a preponderance of the
evidence.35 The differences between criminal and civil proceedings, where
applicable, would be most stringently in favor of the taxpayer in the
criminal action. Therefore, the taxpayer should have no cause to com-
plain against being precluded from relitigating an issue already adjudi-
cated in a proceeding imposing a greater burden on the government.
HERBERT BUCHWALD
32. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, corresponding to § 51(b) of the INT. REV. CODE OF 1939.
33. Compare Cirillo v. Commissioner, 314 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1963), with Spanos v.
United States, 212 F. Supp. 861 (D. Md. 1963).
34. Amos, 43 T.C. 50, 57 (1964).
35. There is an increasing tendency to admit a judgment of conviction into evidence
in a subsequent civil suit based upon the act for which judgment of conviction was rendered.
Twentieth-Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Lardner, 216 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1954). However,
it is difficult to understand why the Lefkowitz court admitted the certified copy of the
indictment, judgment and commitment without demanding introduction of the entire prior
criminal record in order to determine, at the very least, whether there were sufficient facts
contained in the record to justify a finding of willfullness. However, if objection was made
at the trial court level it was not pursued and the error, if any, was not preserved.
